# Signed but not secure

Ben Cartwright-Cox @ NETNOD Meeting 2024

### The Orange Spain incident timeline

#### Rough timeline is

- [???] Orange Spain employee has a compromised computer, and logs into their RIPE NCC Account with the password of "ripeadmin"
- [???] This password is eventually leaked to a publicly searchable engine of compromised credentials
- [Jan 3] Person finds these creds, and logs into Orange Spain's RIPE NCC account, there is no 2FA enabled on the account
- o [09:38] First RPKI Changes are seen
- [13:50~] Person signs ROAs that points 2 Million IP's to a non orange ASN
- [14:30] Orange Spain's traffic is greatly impacted
- [17:30~] Malicious ROA is removed
- o [19:00] Reachability mostly restored

## The Orange Spain incident timeline

#### **Overview for AS12479**

UNI2-AS



	Serial:	018CCCA03D610C56A8B26114CACAA492C123	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:01:01	+0000
	Serial:	018CCE8DFE806D53B6AF86780976FA5C5E32	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:28:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEA79541FF2FE406F12324F5F37FB565	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:34:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEA795DF11AA86FDB9D0604C7ABC7787	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:34:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEAD13B16FBBF99DBF89889D57D24435	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:35:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEAD14312EC218C133862DDB86C6E35E	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:35:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEADFDD8A4A4278808F85500D792D53E	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:37:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEADFE52B43EE7F532D25FA6ABEEEDAD	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:38:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEADFEE8EE2E738A8047549AEA3F83D3	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:37:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEAFD2E19B5B466E8ECB261BB6FCF78F	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:38:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEAFD33C518E5D55F73DEFE0CF45B519	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:38:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEB0BCEE466C216B4B4E85EA7F35BEC0	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:40:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEB0BD8A04A8C3D88E549A9AFF4F671D	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:42:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEB0BDEDEB9D2C37C854E66D2AAE8E1F	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:40:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEB291D3C92312E6F322274F47A36E09	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	13:56:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEB29258A8BEEC939C17779EF1532973	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	09:42:58	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEB466CC73D419B9603215570FCD11A0	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	13:59:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCEB467630BB11AE10AB444852F5DEC23	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	13:56:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCF9CCADFABFDE47BED322C2A70146DA0	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	13:57:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCF9CCB56589E33759693492F3C80EA53	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	13:57:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCF9DB4B58247F22D69273374C535F85E	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	13:59:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCF9DB4F3225287190E207983CCC6BC83	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	13:59:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCF9F88D6B95D010F0D8B936EEFDF6FD5	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	17:38:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCF9F895E3121F718E8F1324610AB45AA	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	14:06:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCF9F89C585D9A0BCD14725310A6EDDD9	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	14:06:49	+0000
	Serial:	018CCFA5F4BE983DCF1DAE0B4C1E81E229AE	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	17:38:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CCFA5F639B426E3589EBF4BDC2DC15041	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	17:38:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CD0680A34A0DA89CB2DE8B87D00691ECE	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	17:43:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CD0680B0F4A8720DC5AF0F637F45619DE	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	17:43:48	+0000
	Serial:	018CD06C9E0AAD4CA5584EFC8D6886807E54	Revocation	Date:	Wed	03	Jan	2024	17:46:48	+0000
Validation:	N/A									


Revoked Certificates:


#### Woops!

- RIPE NCC does not enforce 2FA for users with assets
- RIPE NCC does not have a way to force all members of an account to use 2FA
- It seems to have taken a long time for RIPE and/or Orange to react to this incident
- Their NCC account should not have also been compromised by malware (easier said than done) and certainly shouldn't have had the password of "ripeadmin"
- This also exposed who is not RPKI filtering towards Orange

Woops










# Two possible takeaways

- How fast did networks drop/restore?
- How do you fix stuff like this in a emergency?


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


























## AWS Hearsay

- Apparently AWS could still reach Orange ES
- This would imply a lack of ROV on AWS side
- I tried to replicate this myself with a peering session, and failed
- Either this is false, or there is some special arrangement for some peers/PNIs



The bgp.tools monitoring history

How could you fix this problem in production?

## S.L.U.R.M

Simplified

Local

Internet...

Number Resource Management



#### S.L.U.R.M

Simpli

Local

Interne

Numb

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

Request for Comments: 8416 Category: Standards Track

ISSN: 2070-1721

Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI (SLURM)

Abstract

D. Ma ZDNS D. Mandelberg Unaffiliated T. Bruijnzeels NLnet Labs August 2018

Secure Inter-Domain Routing
Internet-Draft
S. Intended status: Best Current Practice
Expires: August 14, 2014

Sim
Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-dseomn-sidr-slurm-00

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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Unaffiliated T. Bruijnzeels NLnet Labs August 2018

D. Mandelberg

D. Ma

ZDNS

(SLURM)

Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI

Abstract

#### SLURM lets you inject/filter RPKI data

- Filtering is useful for:
  - A customer who is calling you up urgently asking you to ignore RPKI for their prefixes because it's wrong (and the update may take up to 30 mins to properagte)
  - Handling known bad RPKI data from someone else (Like this Orange Incident)
- Injection is useful for:
  - Forcing your own routes to always be RPKI Valid,
  - Allowing your /32 blackhole routes to be RPKI valid (or other workaround/hacks)

### SLURM Examples

ROAs for 10.0.0.0/24+AS65000 will be removed from the validator input

```
A ROA for
```

10.2.0.0/25{to 26}+AS65002

will always exist

```
"slurmVersion": 1,
"validationOutputFilters": {
  "prefixFilters": [
      "asn": 65000,
      "prefix": "10.0.0.0/\overline{24}"
  "bqpsecFilters": []
"locallyAddedAssertions": {
  "prefixAssertions": [
      "asn": 65002,
      "prefix": "10.2.0.0/25",
      "maxPrefixLength": 26
```

#### SLURM Support

- Routinator <a href="https://routinator.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/stable/local-exceptions.html">https://routinator.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/stable/local-exceptions.html</a>
- StayRTR, add -slurm.json to the process
- GoRTR, use StayRTR
- FORT, Ensure you are on a recent version, then check your docs

I cannot in good faith recommend other RPKI Validators/RTR Implementations right now

#### Takeaways

- Bad passwords are everywhere, Use 2FA and enforce it with policy
- Even if you don't validate ROV, your upstreams likely do
- You can mitigate incidents like this for yourself or customers with SLURM
- HE does not do ROV validation in the way you would expect
  - Either that or it's busted
- It takes longer for your prefixes to come back from a RPKI incident than it does for it to disappear

#### Takeaways

- Bad passwords are everywhere, Use 2FA and enforce it with policy
- Even if you don't validate ROV, your upstreams likely do
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  - Either that or it's busted
- It takes longer for your prefixes to come back from a RPKI incident than it does for it to disappear
- And finally...

#### Feed more collectors!

More people should feed route collectors to help future research of incidents like this!

https://bgp.tools/kb/setup-sessions

https://github.com/routeviews/issues/issues

https://radar.grator.net/ (Login to account, in settings)

I legitimately could not figure out where RIS/Catchpoint/1000Eyes

### bgp.tools's IX collector footprint

- NETNOD Stockholm and Copenhagen
- ₩ LINX + LONAP
- FrysIX + INTERIX
- DE-CIX All Germany, New York, Chicago, Madrid, etc.
- BIX
- SOX Serbia
- BCIX
- THINX Warsaw
- InterLAN
- IX.BR Sao Paulo
- NIX.CZ

More on:

https://bgp.tools/as/212232#ix

# Thanks, Questions?

Private comments also accepted at <a href="mailto:ben@benjojo.co.uk">ben@benjojo.co.uk</a>